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Restore, Revert, Repeat:
Examining the Decompensation Cycle
and the Due Process Limitations on
the Treatment of Incompetent
Defendants
Though correctionalfacilities are one of the largest providers of
mental health care in the country, the treatment provided often fails to
address the needs of many mentally ill inmates. Indeed, after receiving
treatment at a state mental health facility, many pretrialdetainees who
have been recently restored to competency revert to an incompetent
state-or decompensate-upon their return to jail, at which point they
must return to the state treatment facility to be restored to competency
once again. This Note is the first to explore this "decompensationcycle,"
highlighting the significance of the problem and demonstrating how
mental health treatment provided by correctionalfacilities, or the lack
thereof, can lead to decompensation. Ultimately, this Note argues that
the decompensation cycle and inadequate mental health treatment
provided to recently restoredpretrial detainees violates the Due Process
Clause. Therefore, courts must step in and requirejails to maintain the
treatment regimen recommended by the state competency treatment
facility. Furthermore, this Note advocates for the use of telemedicine in
correctional facilities as one way to improve treatment and end the
decompensation cycle.
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INTRODUCTION

The number of mentally ill individuals in the criminal justice
system is staggering. The current population of jail or prison inmates
with a mental illness surpasses the populations of cities like Cleveland,
New Orleans, and St. Louis.' And each year, two million people with
mental illnesses are booked into jails. 2 Indeed, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics reported that fifty-six percent of state prisoners, forty-five
percent of federal prisoners, and sixty-four percent of jail inmates suffer
from a mental health problem.3 As a comparison, the rate of mental

1.
Matt Ford, America's Largest Mental Health HospitalIs a Jail, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/americas-largest-mental-hospital-is-ajail/395012/ (https://perma.cc/3ZGH-4SKJ]. A 2003 New York Times article reported that two
correctional facilities-the Los Angeles County Jail and Rikers Island-were the two largest
psychiatric inpatient institutions. Sally Satel, Out of the Asylum, Into the Cell, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
1,
2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/1 1/01/opinion/out-of-the-asylum-into-thecell.html?pagewanted=l) [https://perma.cclS7QL-ZRXD].
2.

Jailing People

with

Mental

Illness,

NAT'L

ALLIANCE

ON

MENTAL

http://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Public-Policy/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness
Oct. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N2AV-57P9].
OF

ILLNESS,

(last visited

3.
DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES
1 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf

[https://perma.cc/PDU7-KVX2]. The actual rate of mental illness in correctional facilities varies
based on the definition of mental illness, the study method, and the setting. See Henry J. Steadman
et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 761, 764
(2009); see also B. JAYE ANNO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: GUIDELINES
FOR
THE
MANAGEMENT
OF
AN
ADEQUATE
DELIVERY
SYSTEM
172
(2001),

https://static.nicic.gov/Library/017521.pdf

[http://perma.cc/S7UW-BN47]

(explaining that the
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illness in the general population is estimated to be around eighteen
percent. 4 Moreover, between seven5 and fifteen percent of male inmates
and thirty percent of female inmates suffer from a serious mental
illness, 6 compared to just four percent of adults in the general
population. 7
The prevalence of mental illness within the criminal justice
system continues to grow over time8 due to a variety of factors,
including the deinstitutionalization of state mental health facilities,
lack of community health treatment, and aggressive prosecution for
drug-related offenses. 9 As a result, the largest correctional facilities
now house more mentally ill individuals than many inpatient
psychiatric facilities. 10 However, the mental health treatment available
in correctional facilities is ineffective in addressing inmates' mental
health needs." Numerous studies have demonstrated that inadequate
treatment in correctional facilities exacerbates already-existing mental

variation in the rates of mental illness in prisons is largely a result of the differing definitions of
mental illness).
4.
PrevalenceofAny Mental Illness (AMI) Among U.S. Adults, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/prevalence/any-mental-illness-ami-among-usadults.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/84CZ-H2S6].
5.
Maureen C. Olley et al., Mentally ill Individuals in Limbo: Obstacles and Opportunities
for ProvidingPsychiatricServices to CorrectionsInmates with Mental Illness, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
811, 815 (2009); T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarcerationfor Persons with
Severe Mental Disorders:Searching for RationalHealth Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 287 (1997).
6.
Steadman et al., supra note 3, at 764.
7.
Serious Mental Illness (SMI) Among U.S. Adults, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.govfhealthlstatistics/prevalence/serious-mental-illness-smi-among-usadults.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X9KU-9JUK].
8.
See AZZA ABUDAGGA ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN'S HEALTH RESEARCH GRP. & THE TREATMENT
ADVOCACY CTR., INDIVIDUALS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN COUNTY JAILS: A SURVEY OF

JAIL STAFF'S PERSPECTIVES 18 (2016), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/
documents/jail-survey-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZC-JE9J] (reporting that seventy-five
percent of county jails participating in the survey reported higher numbers of severely mentally
ill inmates from five to ten years prior). In California, only eleven percent of the prison population
was mentally ill in 1998; by 2003, it had grown to sixteen percent and was expected to reach twenty
percent shortly thereafter. Spearlt, Mental Illness in Prison: Inmate Rehabilitation and
CorrectionalOfficers in Crisis, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 277, 280 (2009).
9.
See, e.g., Stone, supranote 5, at 291-98 (describing the causes of the increase in mentally
ill individuals in the criminal justice system).
10. KIDEUK KIM ET AL., THE PROCESSING AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SCAN OF PRACTICE AND BACKGROUND ANALYSIS 9 (2015),

https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/48981/2000173-The-Processing-and[https:/perma.cc/6DKETreatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf
JRGT]; see also Satel, supra note 1 (explaining that two correctional facilities are the largest
providers of inpatient psychiatric care in the country).
11. See infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
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illnesses and symptoms and contributes to the emergence of new
psychiatric concerns. 12
This is particularly problematic for individuals deemed
incompetent to stand trial. Legal incompetence is distinct from, and
considerably narrower than, mental illness. Mental illness is defined as
a "disorder[ ] generally characterized by dysregulation of mood,
thought, and/or behavior as recognized by the . . American Psychiatric
Association." 1 3 Mentally ill individuals are legally incompetent only
when they do not have the ability to either consult with their lawyer or
understand the proceedings against them. 14 Defendants who meet the
standard of incompetency receive restoration treatment-typically at
an inpatient state mental health facility-that is designed to restore
their mental status so that they can both understand and participate in
their own trial. 15 On average, individuals are restored to competency
within ninety days. 16 Prior to, and after receiving competency
treatment, these individuals are often detained in jail to await
treatment or trial, despite the fact that they have not been found guilty
of any crime.1 7 Due to the inadequate mental health treatment provided
at jails, however, many of these recently restored pretrial detainees
revert back to an incompetent or delusional state before the trial begins,
a phenomenon referred to as "decompensation." 18 At this point, the
defendants must go back to the treatment facility to once again be
restored to competency, before returning to jail again to wait for trial,
creating a cycle of decompensation that can persist for years. As an
example, in one notorious Florida case, the defendant, Bobby Lane
McGee, bounced between competency restoration treatment and jail six
times, resulting in a seventeen-year delay in his trial and ultimate
conviction-costing the state $1.3 million. 19
Though scholars have been unable to quantify the prevalence or
severity of the decompensation cycle thus far, it is clear that McGee's
12. See, e.g., Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (explaining that correctional facilities cannot "provide the
range of services mentally ill prisoners need," leading to deterioration).
13.

Mental Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/

mentalhealth/basics/mental-illness.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2MHDTGKU].
14. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (describing the
competency standard to proceed to trial); see also infra Section I.A.
15. For information on competency restoration, see infra Section I.B.
16.

See infra note 57 and accompanying text.

17. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
19. Michael Braga et al., Definition of Insanity, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.tampabay.com/projects/2015/investigations/florida-mental-healthhospitals/competency/ [https://perma.cc/4LH2-Y7LN].
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story is not unique. Indeed, in Florida alone, approximately two
hundred pretrial detainees are sent back to the state's mental health
facility within twelve months of returning to jail after restoration. 20 And
yet, the decompensation cycle remains a relatively unexplored
phenomenon within the criminal justice system and legal literature.
This Note remedies that by illuminating the source and significance of
the decompensation cycle, ultimately arguing that the decompensation
cycle violates pretrial detainees' constitutional rights.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes the
constitutional requirements of competency, describes the competency
evaluation and hearing process, and summarizes the basic components
of competency restoration treatment. Part II discusses the significance
of the decompensation cycle. Section A provides a snapshot of the
decompensation cycle within the criminal justice system. Section B then
establishes the causes of decompensation, highlighting in particular the
inadequate mental health treatment provided at correctional facilities
and the detrimental effects of the structure of our current institutions
on mentally ill individuals. Part III explores the constitutional
implications of the decompensation cycle, detailing the Supreme Court
jurisprudence protecting pretrial detainees' substantive due process
rights. Finally, Part IV argues that judges must order jails to continue
treatment recommended by the state's competency treatment program.
Further, it offers the concrete suggestion that correctional facilities rely
on telemedicine to support such efforts, highlighting how these efforts
can both save money and create efficiencies within the criminal justice
system.
I. COMPETENCY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: RATIONALE AND
RESTORATION

Mental illness can affect an individual's trajectory through the
criminal justice system at numerous points. For instance, instead of
making an arrest, police officers may choose to divert mentally ill
individuals out of the criminal justice system. 2 1 At trial, factfinders may
determine that individuals who were mentally ill at the time of the

20.

Id.

21.

See, e.g., LINDA A. TEPLIN, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, KEEPING THE PEACE: POLICE

DISCRETION AND MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 10-11 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/
jr000244c.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX4A-8Y5W] (explaining how police may choose to handle a
mentally ill individual creating a disturbance); Amy C. Watson et al., Improving Police Response
to Persons with Mental Illness: A Multi-Level Conceptualizationof CIT, 31 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
359 (2008) (describing Crisis Intervention Teams as a way law enforcement diverts mentally ill
individuals from jail).
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crime are not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus should not be sent
to prison. 22 Additionally, a judge may find that an individual is not
competent at the time of trial and halt the legal proceedings until the
defendant is restored to competency-the focus of this Note. This Part
will explain the constitutional standard of competency and the
rationale for this requirement before discussing the judicial procedures
for determining competency and the process for restoring competency.
A. Determining a Defendant's Competency
Dating back as far as the seventeenth century, English common
law required that defendants be competent in order to stand trial,
receive judgment, or be executed. 23 Following this tradition, courts in
the United States declared early in this country's history that "[i]t is
fundamental that an insane person can neither plea to an arraignment,
be subjected to trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or after judgment,
[undergo] punishment." 24 Most importantly, the Supreme Court
determined that the U.S. Constitution requires that defendants
brought to trial be competent. 25 This requirement serves several
purposes. Primarily, it promotes accuracy and reliability in the judicial
system; only a competent defendant can spot inaccuracies in the
prosecution's case or share relevant and important information with his
or her attorney and the court. 26 It also protects numerous constitutional
rights, including due process, the right to effective assistance of counsel,
confrontation rights, and the right to testify on one's behalf. 2 7 Finally,
the competency requirement ensures the fair and just reputation of the
criminal justice system. 28

22. Despite public perception, the insanity defense is used infrequently. Nationwide,
approximately "one percent of felony defendants ... raise the insanity defense," and only 0.002
percent are successful in pleading the defense. Julie E. Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the
Twenty-First Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the
System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1487-88 (2006).
23. Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to Mental Competence
in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 939 (2014); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 446 (1992) ("The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should not be required to
stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage."); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Stand
Trial: Developments in the Law, in 6 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW & PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Bruce Dennis Sales
ed., 1983) (tracing the incompetency doctrine to its common-law origins).
24. See, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899).
25. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
26. Marouf, supra note 23, at 941.
27. Id.; Winick, supra note 23, at 5-6; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975)
(noting that the competency requirement is "fundamental to an adversary system of justice").
28. Marouf, supra note 23, at 941.
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Defendants must be competent at every point of the criminal
process. 29 Though the issue of competency is most often raised by the
defendant's attorney, a number of different parties may raise a
competency concern, including the prosecutor, judge, or an outside
party like a police officer or family member. 30 Once a party has raised
the issue and the court determines that a bona fide doubt of competency
related to a mental illness exists, the defendant must undergo a
competency evaluation. 3 1 Because it can take months to receive a
competency evaluation, 32 some states allow a defendant to be released
from jail to await the evaluation in the community. 33 In practice,
however, few defendants are released from detention at this point. 34
Evaluations are performed by various mental health
professionals in either an inpatient setting, outpatient facility, or even
in the jail itself.35 The Supreme Court established the modern standard
for determining competency in the 1960 case Dusky v. United States.36
Under this standard, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability

29. Winick, supranote 23, at 8-9; see also Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 790 (2d
Cir. 1977) (finding that defendants must be competent even at the sentencing proceeding).
30. Winick, supra note 23, at 8-9; see also 18 U.S.C § 4241 (2012) (providing the different
ways competency can be challenged); Drope, 420 U.S. at 181 ("[A] trial court must always be alert
to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards
of competence to stand trial."); AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH

31 std. 7-4.3 (4th ed. 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/
[https://perma.cc/
criminaljusticestandards/mental-healthstandards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf
6REP-PNB6] (finding that the court "has a continuing obligation, separate and apart from that of
counsel ... to raise the issue of incompetence to proceed at any time the court has a good faith
doubt as to the defendant's competence").
31. Winick, supra note 23, at 9. Competency evaluations are the most common forensic
evaluations ordered by criminal courts. W. Neil Gowensmith, Lookin' for Beds in All the Wrong
Places: Outpatient Competency Restoration as a Promising Approach to Modern Challenges, 22
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293, 293 (2016). Approximately fifty-five thousand evaluations are
ordered each year, and this number has only grown in recent years, paralleling the increase in the
number of mentally ill offenders. Id.; Hal Wortzel et al., Crisis in the Treatment of Incompetence
to Proceed to Trial: Harbinger of a Systemic Illness, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357, 357
(2007). Indeed, a study by the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services found
that defense attorneys were concerned about their client's competency in ten to fifteen percent of
all cases. Michael J. Finkle et al., Competency Courts: A Creative Solution for Restoring
Competency to the Competency Process, 27 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 767, 768 (2009).
32. In one case, the court found that pretrial detainees in Arkansas were waiting up to eight
months just to receive inpatient competency evaluations. Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp.
2d 934, 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
33. See Winick, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that some statutes allow a defendant to be
released on his recognizance after an evaluation is ordered). Historically, the state mental health
facilities conducted competency evaluations. However, outpatient evaluations are becoming more
common over time. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL

AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 1142-43 (6th ed. 2013).
34. Winick, supranote 23, at 12.
35. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 773.
36. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him."37 Although the wording differs slightly,

all states rely on the Dusky standard to determine competency under
state law. 3 8 This is a relatively easy standard to satisfy, allowing a
severely mentally ill defendant-even one who may be overtly
psychotic-to be found competent to stand trial.39
After a defendant's competency evaluation, the judge schedules
a hearing to allow forensic experts to present written reports and
regarding the defendant's
if necessary,
provide testimony,
competency. 40 Most often, there is little debate about a defendant's
competency, and therefore both parties will agree to accept the reports
and avoid a formal hearing. 41 If the court deems the defendant
incompetent, he or she is ordered to receive competency treatment, and
all legal proceedings must halt until the defendant's competency is
restored. 42
B. Restoring a Defendant's Competency
Each year, approximately ten thousand to eighteen thousand
defendants are deemed incompetent to stand trial. 43 In 2007,
incompetent defendants receiving competency treatment occupied
almost four thousand psychiatric hospital beds in the country,
constituting more than ten percent of state psychiatric beds."
Competency treatment can occur in a variety of settings, and is
dependent on the specific state statute and, often, the severity of the

37. Id. at 402.
38. Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations: Guidelinesfor Judges
and Attorneys, 37 CT. REV. 28, 28 (2000).
39. Winick, supra note 23, at 8. For example, an individual diagnosed with schizophrenia and
suffering from severe delusions may be deemed competent if he has the current ability to consult
with his lawyer and generally understands the charges against him and the consequences of a
conviction.
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 5, 14.
43. Gowensmith, supra note 31, at 293; see also Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 775 (finding
that between eighteen and twenty percent of defendants are deemed incompetent).
44. Wortzel et al., supra note 31, at 357. Today, incompetent detainees have surpassed the
number of civil commitments in many states. See Meagan Flynn, The Revolving Door Between Jail
and Mental Health Care in Harris County, Hous. PRESS (Apr. 11, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/the-revolving-door-between-jail-and-mental-health-care-inharris-county-8312008 [https://perma.cc/9TDQ-HNMB] (finding that the State of Texas devotes
more beds in the State's mental health facilities to competency restoration than civil
commitments).

2018]

RESTORE, REVERT, REPEAT

327

charges.4 5 For example, California state law mandates that
incompetent defendants who are charged with specific felonies be
placed in an inpatient setting for at least 180 days. 46 Meanwhile, many
state statutes still provide for automatic inpatient treatment, whereby
individuals are automatically sent to the state mental health facility to
receive treatment for a set period of time or until competency is
restored. 47 As the number of defendants requiring competency
treatment has increased, many states have attempted various reforms
of their restoration programs. By 2009, thirty-five states had statutes
authorizing outpatient competency restoration-allowing people to
attend treatment programs during the day while remaining in the
community-but only sixteen of those states actually had active
outpatient programs in place. 48 And, at least seven states have
attempted jail-based restoration programs. 49 However, implementation
of these efforts has been spotty5 0 and the majority of competency
treatment still occurs primarily at state inpatient mental health
facilities.51

State inpatient facilities employ highly-trained staff who
operate in interdisciplinary teams to provide individualized treatment
plans to each person. 52 The facilities often staff psychiatrists,
psychiatric nurses, social workers, psychologists, and therapists, as
well as guards with psychiatric training.53 Treatment varies depending
on the needs of the patient. Generally, however, restoration involves
45. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 777. For a summary of how states distinguish between
felony and misdemeanor charges, see id. at 770.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1601(a) (West 2017). Specifically, the statute states that for anyone
found incompetent who is charged with
murder, mayhem, aggravated mayhem . .. or any felony involving death, great bodily
injury, or an act which poses a serious threat of bodily harm to another person,
outpatient status ... shall not be available until that person has actually been confined
in a state hospital or other treatment facility for 180 days or more ....
Id.
47. Winick, supra note 23, at 14.
48. Reena Kapoor, Commentary: Jail-Based Competency Restoration, 39 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 311, 311 (2011).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Alan R. Felthous, Enforced Medication in Jails and Prisons: The New
Asylums, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 563, 587 (2015) ("Creation of a bona fide proper hospital unit within
a non-medical correctional facility is a possibility, but it would be at a considerable expense, likely
defeating the hope for budgetary savings from obviating hospital transfer.").
51. See Gowensmith, supra note 31, at 295 (noting that while many states have begun using
outpatient competency evaluations, the competency restoration treatment is still more commonly
delivered inpatient in state hospitals).
52. See Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing the staffing
at the state's competency treatment facility); Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep't
of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (E.D. La. 2010) (same).
53. Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
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psychiatric medication, psychotherapy and social support activities,
education about the legal process, and consistent evaluation. 54
Psychotropic medications, which alter an individual's brain processes,
are the most widely used and effective treatment for psychiatric
conditions resulting in incompetence.5 5 However, many defendants also
receive group and individual psychotherapy designed to help them
restore and maintain function and modify long-term patterns of
maladaptive behavior. 56 On average, competence can be restored within
ninety to 180 days.5 7
II. THE DECOMPENSATION CYCLE: RESTORING COMPETENCY ONLY TO
ALLOW REVERSION UPON RETURN TO JAIL

After competency is restored, defendants return to jail to await
their trial.58 The period immediately following their return to jail is
crucial. Depending on the length of time between their return and trial,
as well as a host of other factors, pretrial detainees who have recently
been restored to competency are at risk of reverting to a delusional or
incompetent state. 59 If this occurs, the person must go back to the
competency treatment facility to be restored to competency, before
returning to jail again to await trial. If the circumstances in the jail do
not change while an individual undergoes a second restoration
treatment, the detainee is at risk of decompensating once again,
creating a cycle of decompensation and restoration.
Individuals cycling through competency and incompetency are
forced to endure significant pain and suffering. Many incompetent

54. Gowensmith, supra note 31, at 294.
55. Winick, supra note 23, at 22. Psychotropic, or psychoactive, medications are chemical
substances that alter one's mental processes and brain function. Psychoactive Substances, WORLD
HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/substance-abuse/terminology/psychoactive-substances/en/
(last visited Oct. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/JXC3-6AQU]. These can include antipsychotic,
antidepressant, and anti-anxiety medications, as well as mood stabilizers. See Fact Sheet:
Commonly Prescribed Psychotropic Medications, NAVL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.namihelps.org/assets/PDFs/fact-sheets/Medications/Commonly-Psyc-Medications.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5E5L-VYTG].
56. Kapoor, supra note 48, at 311-12; see also Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (finding
that trained staff at the state hospital provide prosocial activities, including group, individual,
recreational, and occupational therapy); Stone, supra note 5, at 305-06 (explaining that therapy
is a common form of treatment at competency restoration programs).
57. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 775; Gowensmith, supra note 31, at 294.
58. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776. Alternatively, if a court finds that a defendant is not
likely to be returned to competency, he may be released. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733
(1972) (reasoning that if an incompetent detainee does not improve or if the chances are slight,
then he must be released or granted a hearing for civil commitment). Individuals treated in
outpatient competency restoration programs may remain in the community to await their trial.
59. For the causes of the decompensation cycle, see infra Section II.B.
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defendants are depressed and suicidal, and may attempt to take their
lives while awaiting treatment in jail.60 Others suffer from severe and
debilitating delusions and hallucinations that affect their ability to
understand reality and care for themselves. 61 Additionally, many
individuals exhibit physical symptoms of their mental state, suffering
from severe physical pain or lack of appetite, which can cause
significant weight loss. 62 This Part explores the existence and causes of
the decompensation cycle, highlighting how the provision of mental
health treatment in jails contributes to decompensation.
A. A Snapshot of the Decormpensation Cycle
Several scholars have highlighted the decompensation cycle as
a significant problem within the criminal justice system. 63 Yet, despite
general recognition of this phenomenon and isolated reports of its
prevalence, it is difficult to quantify the extent to which this cycle
actually occurs each year on a national or even statewide level. 6 4 One
analysis reported that almost twenty percent of restored detainees in
two Florida counties decompensate upon returning to jail.6 5 And, across

the entire state of Florida, approximately two hundred detainees each
year must return to competency restoration treatment after they
decompensate in jail. 66

60. See Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (explaining that many incompetent defendants
must be placed in isolation because they are a danger to themselves); Terry ex rel. Terry v. -Hill,
232 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (noting that one incompetent class member tried to kill
himself three times before being transferred for evaluation and treatment).
61. See Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 615; Terry, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40 (describing
how one incompetent detainee "came to jail believing people were controlling his mind and that he
could read other people's minds").
62. See Terry, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 940.
63. See, e.g., Anna Conley, Getting Individuals Committed to the MT State Hospital Out of
County Jails, MONT. LAw., Nov. 2013, at 10, 11 (explaining that just a few weeks in jail without
proper treatment "can lead to significant suffering and deterioration"); Finkle et al., supra note
31, at 771 (finding "systemic problems contribute to some mentally ill defendants getting caught
in a cycle of competency and subsequent decompensation"); Allison D. Redlich et al., Is Diversion
Swift? Comparing Mental Health Court and Traditional Criminal Justice Processing, 39 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 420, 421 (2012) (highlighting that as a result of poor mental health treatment in
jails, many detainees with serious mental illnesses decompensate); Stone, supra note 5, at 285-86
(finding that a lack of adequate resources for mental health treatment contributes to
decompensation).
64. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776 (noting that the authors could not locate any literature
quantifying the percentage of defendants who decompensate).
65. Braga et al., supra note 19.
66. Id.
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Significant anecdotal evidence also demonstrates the magnitude
of this issue.6 7 A Florida newspaper recently explored how the
decompensation cycle delayed the state from trying and convicting one
incompetent pretrial detainee for almost two decades. 68 Bobby Lane
McGee confessed to killing his wife in 1998, claiming that he "was being
attacked by all kinds of demons."6 9 Doctors diagnosed him with
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and after a competency evaluation
the court deemed him incompetent to stand trial. 70 Over the next
seventeen years, McGee was sent to the state mental health facility for
competency restoration treatment six times.7 1 Each time, he was
treated with psychotropic medications and restored to competency, only
to return to jail and decompensate after he stopped taking his
medications. 7 2
of the
Courts have also highlighted the existence
decompensation cycle. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has explained that the longer mentally ill detainees are
in jail or prison, "the greater the likelihood they will decompensate and
suffer unduly." 7 3 Similarly, in a California case, one expert noted that
"inmates usually decompensate quickly and require intensive
psychiatric care and/or readmission to inpatient care." 74
B. Systemic Causes of Decompensation
Several aspects of the criminal justice system contribute to
decompensation. One potential cause may be the traditional methods of
control relied on by correctional facilities, particularly isolation and
transfers, which can easily exacerbate a mentally ill individual's

67. Id. (finding that restored detainees are sent back to jail and quickly decompensate
without medication); Paul A. Romer, Courts Struggle with "Conundrum": Officials Not Sure How
to Proceed with Incompetent Defendants, TEMPLE DAILY TELEGRAM (Sept. 9, 2009),
http://www.tdtnews.com/archive/articleaf035552-0763-5072-a26d-91ec619f373f.html
[https://perma.cc/566H-NK4N] (recognizing that after an incompetent defendant is restored to
competency through medications and sent back to jail, "a lot of times, they'll decompensate when
they're [back in jail]").
68. Braga et al., supra note 19.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Curtis Krueger, After Years of Mental Incompetence, Bobby McGee Faces
Murder Trial in Pinellas, TAMPA BAY
TIMES
(May
18,
2014,
10:08 PM),
http://www.tampabay.comlnews/courts/criminal/after-years-of-mental-incompetence-bobbymcgee-faces-murder-trial-in/2180395 [https://perma.cc/88CF-HPC8] (explaining that the jail did
not have the equipment to forcibly medicate McGee when he refused to take his medications).
73. Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
74. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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symptoms. 75 Often, jail and prison staff place inmates in isolation

confinement to protect either the safety of the isolated inmate or others,
await the inmate's transfer, punish the inmate for violating a facility
rule, or to provide for an inmate with special needs-such as mental
health. 76 While isolation occurs frequently in correctional facilities, 77
those recently restored to
mentally ill inmates-including
competency-are disproportionately placed in isolation or security
housing units compared to the general prison population.78 A recent
Department of Justice report highlighted this discrepancy, finding that
twenty-six percent of prison inmates and twenty-three percent of jail
inmates with a mental health disorder were placed in restrictive
housing at some point during the year, compared with fourteen percent
of prison inmates and twelve percent of jail inmates without a mental
illness.79
While in isolation, inmates are often placed in small cellssometimes not even large enough to fit a bed-for up to twenty-three
hours a day.80 Mental health treatment, and medical care in general,
may be limited for individuals housed in these units. Despite the welldocumented need for mental health treatment among this population,
jails may knowingly choose to provide fewer psychiatric services to
75. NAT'L COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYs., MENTAL HEALTH IN
AMERICA'S PRISONS 92 (Henry J. Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza eds., 1993); see also In re Medley,
134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890):
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement [in
isolation], into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse
them, and others became violently insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not
recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.;
Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d 603, 612
(E.D. La. 2010) (explaining that it is problematic that inmates do not feel safe when incarcerated
because "it is important for psychotic patients to feel safe in their environment"). More broadly,
studies have shown that just being detained in any correctional facility can exacerbate mental
illnesses. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have Drugs at Your
Command" Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the
Perspective of InternationalHuman Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 381, 392
(2015) (finding that detainment exacerbates mental health symptoms).
76. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS
AND JAILS, 2011-12, at 2 (2015); see also Mink, 322 F.3d at 1120 (finding that detainees exhibiting
troublesome behavior may be locked in a cell for twenty-two to twenty-three hours a day).
77. Approximately twenty percent of prison inmates and eighteen percent of jail inmates are
placed in some form of restrictive housing each year. BECK, supra note 76, at 1.
78. Fellner, supra note 12, at 402-03 (finding that between one-quarter and one-half of all
inmates in isolation are mentally ill); see also Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (finding that
mentally ill inmates are more likely to be subject to discipline, resulting in segregation from other
inmates); Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1223 (noting that mentally ill inmates are more likely to be
housed in segregated housing units due to their disruptive behavior).
79. BECK, supra note 76, at 6.
80. Mink, 322 F.3d at 1120; Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1229.

332

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1:319

those in isolation confinement.8 1 Indeed, the provision of mental health
treatment is often limited to conversations with staff through the cell
door, medication dispersal, and infrequent consultations with a
psychiatrist. 82 Any form of therapy is generally unavailable. Recently
restored pretrial detainees-many of whom may still have behavioral
problems-who are sent to restrictive housing may quickly
decompensate due to the lack of care. For these reasons, at least one
court has found that the use of security housing units for the severely
mentally ill is unreasonable, as it is like "putting an asthmatic in a
place with little air to breathe." 83
More commonly, it is the systemic problems with the mental
health treatment available in jails and prisons that contribute to the
decompensation cycle. 84 Correctional facilities must provide mental
health services, but can choose the method by which care is delivered. 85
For instance, a jail may choose to provide mental health treatment
through medical staff in the jail's own hospital facility, have small
psychiatric units in the jail itself, rely on private contractors to provide
services, or choose any combination of these methods.86 Currently,
twenty-seven states deliver inpatient mental health care in the jail
setting and forty-five provide outpatient care in jail.87
Despite this mandate, it is well established that jails and
prisons-particularly smaller, rural facilities-are inadequately suited
81. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1223.
82. Fellner, supra note 12, at 404.
83. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1265. Additionally, the American Bar Association has
recommended that prisons refrain from placing inmates with serious mental illnesses in isolation.
AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 23-2.8(a) (3d

ed. 2011) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublications/criminal justicestandards/
Treatment-ofPrisoners.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.ce/5CGU-G7N]
("No
prisoner
diagnosed with serious mental illness should be placed in long-term segregated housing.").
84. See Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776 (describing several deficiencies within the mental
health treatment provided to detainees at jails); Stone, supra note 5, at 286 (finding that
inadequate mental health resources lead to this decompensation cycle); see also Conley, supra note
63, at 10-11 (noting that pretrial detainees awaiting competency evaluations may receive no
treatment while waiting to be transferred).
85. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 ("[W]hen the
state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.");
JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 3, at 9 (explaining that correctional facilities may choose how to
provide health care services).
86.

NAT'L COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., supra note 75, at 47.
87. KARISHMA A. CHARI ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., No. 96, NATIONAL
SURVEY OF PRISON HEALTH CARE: SELECTED FINDINGS 5 (2016). In this survey, inpatient mental

health care was defined as care requiring an overnight stay. See id. at 19 (asking participating
prison system administrators whether they offered "inpatient mental health (overnight)" or
"outpatient mental health"). Generally, inpatient treatment addresses more serious health needs,
while outpatient care offers treatment for illnesses that do not require a prolonged stay at a health
facility.
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to manage and treat mental and psychotic disorders. 88 For instance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics found that only one in three state prisoners
and one in six jail inmates with mental health problems had received
mental health treatment since admission.8 9 Many jails-particularly
small facilities-may be unwilling or unable to provide treatment
beyond medication dispersal.90
Staffing of health personnel at correctional facilities is often
inadequate, both in terms of sheer numbers and training. 91 For
instance, a district court in Louisiana found that one part-time
psychiatrist and one psychiatry resident ("who sees patients when
necessary") were responsible for caring for more than one thousand
inmates. 92 Meanwhile, at the Louisiana state mental health facility
that provided competency restoration treatment, the ratio of
psychiatrists to patients was one to thirty or thirty-five. 93 Further,
small facilities may not have any medical staff with psychiatric
training. 94 And, often, general prison staff receive minimal mental
health training and may not even be informed that a detainee has been

88. See, e.g., Fellner, supranote 12, at 394 (describing the inadequacies in the criminal justice
system in providing mental health treatment); Redlich et al., supra note 63, at 421 (noting the "jail
particularly difficult for persons with serious mental illness"). This Note
environment is ...
acknowledges that the provision of mental health treatment in prisons and jails differs widely
between facilities. Certainly, some of the inadequacies described in this Section may not be present
in larger, more well-funded facilities.
89. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 3, at 1. Additionally, the Department of Justice reported that
twenty-seven percent of state prisoners, nineteen percent of federal prisoners, and fifteen percent
of jail inmates with mental health problems used prescribed medications since admission. Id. at
9.

90. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776; see also Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v.
La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d 603, 612 (E.D. La. 2010) (explaining that inmates
have "large stretches of unoccupied and unproductive time that makes it difficult to cultivate a
therapeutic environment"); JAMES & GLAZE, supranote 3, at 1 (finding that twenty-three percent
of state prisoners, fifteen percent of federal prisoners, and seven percent of jail inmates with
mental health problems received professional mental health therapy after admission); Fellner,
supra note 12, at 394 (noting that prisoners often live without the "diversity of mental health
interventions they need," causing their symptoms to deteriorate). A recent survey found that only
ten percent of county jails provide group psychotherapy. ABUDAGGA ET AL., supra note 8, at 42.
91. A national study of jails found that the ratio of generally trained health personnel to
inmates ranged from a low of one to seventy-six to a high of one to sixteen, with a mean of one to
thirty-five. ANNO, supra note 3, at 119. It is challenging to come up with an appropriate ratio for
staffing across correctional facilities, as the ratio is dependent on the characteristics of the
correctional facility, its inmates, and their health care needs. Id. at 124-27; see also BARBARA
KRAUTH, STAFF/INMATE RATIOS: WHY IT'S So HARD TO GET TO THE BOTTOM LINE 1 (1998)

(explaining that two identical jails will have different staff-inmate ratios).
92. Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
93. Id. at 612.
94. Id. at 614; Fellner, supranote 12, at 394 (finding mentally ill prisoners confront a paucity
of qualified staff); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Access to the
medical staff has no meaning if the medical staff is not competent to deal with the prisoners'
problems.").
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deemed incompetent.95 This lack of training not only presents concerns
with
identifying
mental
health
issues
(and recognizing
decompensation), but also with the provision of treatment. 96 More
generally, low staffing can also lead to treatment models that focus
solely on crisis prevention, whereby staff can only address those with
the most pressing, and likely disruptive, symptoms. 9 7

Moreover, many correctional facilities do not consistently or
reliably give inmates medications prescribed by the competency
restoration facility. 98 Given that psychotropic medications are the most
common and effective method of treatment provided to restore
defendants to competency, 99 the inadequate provision of psychotropic
medications to recently restored defendants, even if only for a short
period of time, can easily trigger decompensation.1 0 0
There are many reasons why medication may not be
appropriately dispensed. Staffing levels and training significantly
affect the provision of medication to inmates. At facilities with fewer
staff members, the nurses are often overworked and thus may not have
time to ensure inmates actually take their medication. 101 Relatedly,
95. See Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (finding guards in parish jails receive minimal
mental health training); Fellner, supra note 12, at 396 (reporting that most facilities "do not
provide correctional officers with more than minimal mental health training"); Meredith Karasch,
Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil Liberties, and the Right to Mental Health Care Collide:An
Overview of California's Mental Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 493, 521 (2003) ('The bizarre
behavior that mentally ill people display is often met with a lack of understanding and violence by
guards and inmates."); Spearlt, supra note 8, at 281 (finding prison staff often are not trained to
recognize "genuine mental illness"). In contrast, a recent survey of county jails found that seventytwo percent reported providing formal training on handling mentally ill inmates. However, for the
majority of these jails, this training constituted only two to three percent of their overall training.
ABUDAGGA ET AL., supra note 8, at 28, 30.

96. See Spearlt, supra note 8, at 281-82 (explaining that the lack of mental health training
precludes guards from recognizing serious mental illnesses). One particular concern in the
provision of treatment is the potential detrimental side effects caused by psychotropic medications.
97. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1217-18 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that the
staffing levels led to care directed at inmates experiencing "disruptive, bizarre or aberrant
behavior, making suicidal statements or gestures, or experiencing a personal family crisis").
98. See id. at 1224 (explaining how the prison did not provide an inmate's prescribed
medication for five months upon his admission, and then stopped giving it later "for no reason
apparent in the record," causing the inmate to deteriorate to a violent state); Finkle et al., supra
note 31, at 776 ("Adherence to psychiatric medications is a documented problem. Because of the
side-effects of medication, stigma among other prisoners, or a lack of insight into his or her
condition, a defendant may begin to refuse medications while incarcerated, and decompensate
further." (internal citations omitted)); Spearlt, supranote 8, at 286 ("[Mlany prisoners are left with
inappropriate types or amounts of psychotropic medication that further impairs their ability to
function."); supranote 89 and accompanying text.
99. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 777.
100. Brenda C. Desmond & Paul J. Lenz, Mental Health Courts: An Effective Way for Treating
Offenders with Serious Mental Illness, 34 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 525, 526 (2010).
101. Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d
603, 612 (E.D. La. 2010).

2018]

RESTORE, REVERT, REPEAT

335

some prisons may not even have a system to ensure inmates receive
their medication. 102 For instance, in California, a study found that poor
prison policy left many prisoners with inappropriate types or amounts
of psychotropic medication that further impaired their ability to
function. 103 Alternatively, the prison administration may decide to
withhold medication due to cost or a general dislike of psychotropic
medications. In Wisconsin, for example, a task force found that a county
jail's health provider actually had a policy against providing
psychotropic medications-what he called "feel good" drugs-to
inmates. 104 And, a Washington state investigation revealed that, due to
rising drug costs, one county jail was charging defendants for
psychiatric medications. 105

Finally, mentally ill individuals themselves often refuse to take
medication upon returning to jail. 106 There are numerous reasons why
an individual may refuse medications, including potential side effects,
stigma among the other prisoners, or a lack of awareness about the
severity or presence of a mental health condition.10 7 Though jails may
legally force inmates to take medication,1 08 many lack the resources to
do so.
Given these deficiencies, it is clear that the longer the time
between the restoration of competency and a defendant's trial, the
greater the risk that he or she will decompensate. 109 Once a detainee
decompensates, however, competency treatment is often not quickly
forthcoming. Given a lack of funding for mental health treatment,
pretrial detainees often face long waiting periods to receive competency
treatment. 110 In California, for example, approximately three-hundred

102. A recent study of county jails found that only forty-two percent provide pharmacy
services. ABUDAGGA ET AL., supra note 8, at 38.
103. Spearlt, supra note 8, at 286 (finding that drug treatment is often interrupted when
prisoners are transferred between prisons or are under lockdown).
104. Desmond & Lenz, supra note 100, at 526.
105. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776; see ABUDAGGA ET AL., supra note 8, at 40 (finding that
the "cost of medications to treat the mental illnesses has increased substantially" (quoting jail
survey response)).
106. Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 776.
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
109. See Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 771, 776; see also Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep't of
Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1022 (W.D. Wash. 2015):
Each additional day of incarceration causes further deterioration of class members'
mental health, increases the risks of suicide and of victimization by other inmates, and
causes illness to become more habitual and harder to cure, resulting in longer
restoration periods or in the inability to ever restore that person to competency.
110.See Michael J. Churgin, The Transfer of Inmates to Mental Health Facilities:Developments in
the Law, in 6 MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
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pretrial detainees are waiting to receive competency treatment each
month"' and, in some states, pretrial detainees are forced to wait in
jail for up to a year before being transferred to the state treatment
facility. 112 Therefore, recently decompensated detainees may further
deteriorate as they wait in jail for treatment, despite the fact that they
have not been proven guilty of committing a crime.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DECOMPENSATION CYCLE: DUE
PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PRETRIAL DETENTION AND THE PROVISION
OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
Leaving incompetent detainees to suffer through periods of
decompensation and endure long periods of incarceration before a
finding of guilt not only raises serious ethical concerns, but also
implicates many individual rights protected by the Constitution. This
Part will explain how the current provision of mental health treatment
in jails and the decompensation cycle violates the Due Process Clause,
both by infringing on a pretrial detainee's liberty interests in
restorative treatment and freedom from incarceration and by violating
a detainee's basic right to adequate medical treatment.
A. The ConstitutionalRight to Be Free from Punishment
As a "'general rule' of substantive due process, . .. the
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a
criminal trial." 113 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has permitted
pretrial detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments when the government's regulatory interest
outweighs the individual's liberty interest, and has specifically
permitted the detention of individuals deemed incompetent to stand
trial.114 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the

207, 227 (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1983) (finding jails "usually are dependent on financiallystrapped local governments for their funding" and therefore rarely receive funding for
comprehensive mental health treatment); see also Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934,
936-37 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (explaining that while the state hospital is licensed for 315 beds, it only
has 186 due to funding, space, and personnel shortages).
111. Patrick S. Pemberton, Mentally Ill Defendants Languish in Jail from Lack of Hospital
Space, TRIBUNE (Jan. 4, 2014, 7:46 PM), http://www.sanluisobispo.comlnews/locallinvestigations/
article39465075.html [https://perma.cc/T9TC-MWLA].
112. Terry, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 938. Numerous courts have found these waiting periods to
violate a pretrial detainee's due process rights. See infra Section III.A.
113. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
114. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972) (finding it constitutional to detain a
mentally incompetent defendant prior to trial); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375
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substantive due process rights of pretrial detainees and civil
committees has clearly established that pretrial detainees deemed
incompetent to stand trial retain significant liberty interests under the
Due Process Clause.
In Jackson v. Indiana-perhaps the most seminal case
establishing the substantive due process rights of incompetent pretrial
detainees-the Supreme Court determined that "due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."1 1 5 Given
that the purpose for which incompetent individuals are detained is
restoration, an individual detained solely due to incompetency "cannot
be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that
capacity in the foreseeable future." 116 If a defendant cannot be returned
to competency-as appeared to be the case for the defendant in
Jackson117-then the state must either institute civil commitment
proceedings or release the individual. 118
Further, under the Due Process Clause, correctional facilities
cannot subject pretrial detainees to restrictions and conditions of
confinement that constitute punishment.1 1 9 Jails may impose
conditions or restrictions that are "reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective," such as assuring presence at trial,
maintaining security, and ensuring discipline. 1 2 0 However, arbitrary
and purposeless restrictions or conditions amount to punishment, and
therefore cannot be imposed upon pretrial detainees. 121
To determine the constitutionally mandated conditions of
confinement, courts must balance the individual's liberty interest with
the state's asserted purpose for confinement. 1 2 2 To conduct this balance

(1956) (same); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49 (listing the cases in which the Court has found
the state may detain an individual prior to any conviction).
115. 406 U.S. at 738.
116. Id.
117. A trial court ordered Jackson to be detained in a state mental health facility until he
became "sane," despite expert testimony that he could never be restored to competency. Id. at 71819.
118. Id. at 738. In practice, however, many individuals remain in competency treatment for
years. See Andrew R. Kaufman et al., Forty Years After Jackson v. Indiana: State Compliance with
"Reasonable Period of Time" Ruling, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 262-64 (2012)
(discussing various studies that showed states are not complying with Jackson).
119. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979).
120. Id. at 539-40.
121. Id. at 539.
122. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1982) (asserting that the proper
constitutional inquiry balances the liberty interests of the individual with any relevant state

338

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1:319

and minimize "interference by the federal judiciary with the internal
operations of these institutions," courts must give deference to
professional judgment. 123 Essentially, "liability may be imposed only
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment." 124 For example, in Youngberg v. Romeo,
the Supreme Court found that civil committees retain liberty interests
in safety, freedom from restraint, and minimally adequate training
sufficient to ensure the protection of these interests. 12 5 Rather than
dictating what that training might look like, the Court stated only that
states must provide training "as an appropriate professional would
consider reasonable" to fulfill the individual's liberty interests. 126
Through the line of cases beginning with Jackson, the Supreme
Court has established that if a facility has imposed restrictions and
conditions that are not reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest and the reason for which an individual was detained, then the
conditions constitute punishment and violate the detainee's liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. Lower courts have relied on
these decisions to protect the substantive due process rights of
incompetent pretrial detainees. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington described the interests at stake and the
balance courts conduct when considering delays in competency
evaluation and treatment under the Jackson line of cases, noting:
[Tihe gravity of the harms suffered by the class members during prolonged
incarceration ...
directly conflict with [pretrial detainees'] rights to freedom from
incarceration and to the competency services which form the basis of their detention,
and. .. with the State's interests in swiftly bringing those accused of crimes to trial and
in restoring incompetent criminal defendants to competency so as to try them. 127

In other words, the continued incarceration of incompetent
detainees-without proper treatment for their mental illnesses-did
not further the state's interest in their restoration and, ultimately, their
conviction. Relying on similar reasoning, several courts have found that

interests, such as "the State's asserted reasons for restraining individual liberty" through
confinement).
123. Id. at 322.
124. Id. at 323.
125. Id. at 318, 322-24. The Court defined minimally adequate training as training that "may
be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable
restraints." Id. at 322.
126. Id. at 324.
127. Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1022 (W.D.
Wash. 2015).
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significant delays in receiving competency treatment, resulting in
prolonged pretrial detention, violate the Due Process Clause. 128
For example, in Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, the plaintiffsappellees claimed that delays in admitting pretrial detainees to
competency treatment violated the Due Process Clause. 1 29 Pretrial
detainees were waiting in jail to be transferred to the state facility for
"two, three, or even five months" due to limited state funding. 1 30 In
addition to recognizing a broad liberty interest in freedom from
restraint, the court asserted that incompetent pretrial detainees also
have a liberty interest in restorative treatment. 13 1 On the other side of
the balance, the court found that the delays failed to serve the state's
interest in restoring competency and bringing these individuals to
trial. 132 Therefore, relying on the framework established in Jackson and
Youngberg, the Ninth Circuit held that the delays violated a detainee's
due process rights because the "nature and duration of their
incarceration [bore] no reasonable relation to the evaluative and
restorative purposes . . . ."133 Consequently, the court ordered the state
to admit incompetent detainees within seven days, explaining that the
state could not rely on a "lack of funds, staff, or facilities" to justify its
failure to provide the necessary treatment in a timely manner. 134
Similarly, in Advocacy Center for the Elderly and Disabled v.
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, the plaintiffs argued
that both the delays before being transferred to the state's competency
program and the mental health treatment they received in jail were
unrelated to the state's purpose in restoring their competency,
amounting to punishment.135 After examining the jail's mental health
treatment program, the court determined that the care provided at the
jail was inadequate because it did not meet the professional standard

128. However, at least one state court has denied a plaintiffs facial challenge under its state
constitution for delays in treatment caused by a statute that required all incompetent defendants
to be treated at the state mental health facility. See Lakey v. Taylor, 435 S.W.3d 309, 313, 321-22
(Tex. Ct. App. 2014). The court reasoned that because some incompetent individuals are also
detained based on their danger to others, the State had a compelling and legitimate interest in
detaining the defendant aside from restoration, making the delays justifiable and constitutional.
Id.
129. 322 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 1106. Alternatively, the State allowed defendants to be sent home under
supervision if commitment was not required. Id. at 1115.
131. Id. at 1121.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1122.
134. Id. at 1121, 1123 (quoting Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Following this trial, Oregon significantly increased the state hospital's capacity to manage the
increasing number of competency treatment detainees. Gowensmith, supra note 31, at 294.
135. 731 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607 (E.D. La. 2010).
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of care provided at the state forensic facility or other competency
programs. 136 Specifically, the jail was understaffed, did not provide
adequate psychiatric services, and could not ensure pretrial detainees
took their medications. 137 Further, the court noted that the
circumstances failed the "Youngberg inquiry" because detainees faced
long delays and inadequate treatment, directly in contradiction with
the recommendation by a court and a "panel of mental health
professionals." 38 Therefore, the delays and inadequate treatment
amounted to punishment and were not reasonably related to the state's
asserted interest in ultimately bringing the individuals to trial. 139 As a
result, the court held that the extended delays in jail violated pretrial
detainees' substantive due process rights and ordered the jails to
transfer individuals to the state facility within twenty-one days.1 4 0
Some scholars have interpreted the Jackson line of cases
through Seling v. Youngl 41 more broadly, arguing that these cases
demonstrate that state facilities have an affirmative obligation to
provide treatment to protect and enhance a detainee's liberty
interests. 142 In the civil commitment context, courts have been willing
to recognize such an affirmative obligation. For instance, some courts
have suggested that the Due Process Clause requires treatment that
provides "a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve the mental
condition for which they were confined." 143 And, in Seling, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that civil committees may challenge a lack of

136. Id. at 611-15.
137. Id. at 612-15.
138. Id. at 609-10, 623.
139. Id. at 623-24.
140. Id. at 611, 627. In a similar case from the Eastern District of Arkansas, the court came to
a similar conclusion based primarily on Bell, reasoning that
the delay in transferring court ordered pretrial detainees to the [state facility] for
evaluation or treatment, amounts to punishment of the detainees. The lack of inpatient
mental health treatment, combined with the prolonged wait in confinement,
transgresses the constitution. The lengthy and indefinite periods of incarceration,
without any legal adjudication of the crime charged, caused by the lack of space at [the
state facility], is not related to any legitimate goal, is purposeless and cannot be
constitutionally inflicted upon the members of the class.
Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934, 943-44 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (relying on Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979).
141. 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
142. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 344, 358 (2003); see also
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) ("[Rjespondent's liberty interests require the State
to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint.").
143. Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000).
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proper treatment based on their substantive due process rights. 144 The
plaintiff in that case challenged a Washington statute that provided for
the civil commitment of sexually violent offenders, claiming that it
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and ex post facto guarantees, as
well as his substantive due process rights. 1 45 Because the Ninth Circuit
did not consider the due process challenge, the Supreme Court's holding
was limited: as-applied, the act did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause or ex post facto guarantees. 14 6 Nevertheless, citing Jackson, the
Court emphasized in dicta that if no mental health treatment is
provided, there may be a substantive due process violation because the
failure to provide adequate treatment would not be reasonably related
to the statute's purpose to incapacitate and treat these individuals. 147
Thus, the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the Jackson line of
cases has significant implications for the rights of incompetent pretrial
detainees stuck in the decompensation cycle. As demonstrated in Mink
and Advocacy Center, lower courts have applied the Supreme Court's
balancing test to weigh the state's interest in detaining incompetent
individuals to bring them to trial with the individual's interest in
freedom from incarceration and restorative treatment.148 Like
detainees waiting for competency treatment, individuals who return to
jail after being restored to competency continue to have an interest in
freedom from incarceration, and arguably also retain their interest in
restorative treatment and in maintaining a competent mental state.
Nevertheless, many pretrial detainees return to jail only to receive
inadequate treatment, forcing them to be detained for a longer period
of time. 149 Importantly, this treatment is often in direct contradiction
with the treatment prescribed and recommended by the competency
facility, failing the Youngberg inquiry.150 Therefore, providing
inadequate mental health treatment in jail to recently restored
detainees may violate their substantive due process rights: it does not

144. 531 U.S. at 265.
145. Id. at 253-56.
146. Id. at 263.
147. Id. at 265 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); see also Janus & Logan,
supra note 142, at 335-36 (finding that the Court in Seling v. Young "was at pains to emphasize
that other potential claims, in particular substantive due process, were not implicated" because
the statute was designed to incapacitate and treat).
148. See supra notes 129-140 and accompanying text.
149. See supra Part II.
150. See Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp.
2d 603, 610, 623 (E.D. La. 2010) (finding delays in treatment failed the Youngberg inquiry because
they were in direct contradiction with the opinion of mental health professionals and the court);
supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (explaining that many detainees do not receive
prescribed medication).
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bear a "reasonable relation" to either freedom from incarceration or the
maintenance of competency necessary to bring them to trial, nor does it
comply with a professional's judgment. 15 1 This potential violation is
only magnified by the fact that once a detainee does decompensate, he
or she may be forced to wait in jail to return to competency treatment,
raising additional due process concerns.152
Additionally, the Jackson line of cases suggests a potential
durational limit stemming from the Due Process Clause. 15 3 In Jackson,
the Court explicitly stated that the duration of confinement must be
related to the state's purpose, and held that states could not hold an
individual longer than is necessary to determine if he or she will be
restored to competency. 154 Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court stated
that "hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious
questions under the Due Process Clause." 15 5 Mink and Advocacy Center
provide further support for this notion, highlighting that an extended
period of time in jail unrelated to the rehabilitative purpose of the
detention may violate the Due Process Clause. 15 6 Tracking these cases,
Professors Janus and Logan suggest that "[c]onfinement that is
[otherwise] non-punitive ...

can become punitive if its duration is

excessive." 15 7 Such a durational limitation would provide another
potential due process concern when, under the decompensation cycle,
detainees bounce between jail and the competency treatment facility for
a significant period of time.
Finally, if cases like Youngberg and Seling establish an
affirmative obligation to provide treatment for individuals who are
civilly committed, it stands to reason that this obligation extends to

151. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (noting there is a presumption of
validity if the treatment follows a professional judgment); Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (holding that
due process requires a reasonable relation between the purpose and the nature of confinement);
cf. Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that delays in
transferring incompetent detainees violated the detainees' due process rights); Advocacy Ctr., 731
F. Supp. 2d at 621 (finding "the continued imprisonment of the Incompetent Detainees in parish
jails" violated the Due Process Clause because it did not relate to the nature of commitment).
152. See supra notes 112, 129-140 and accompanying text (detailing the due process concerns
triggered by extended imprisonment of detainees awaiting treatment).
153. See Janus & Logan, supra note 142, at 355 (explaining that the Jackson line of cases
demonstrates that "confinement that is durationally out of proportion to the state's non-punitive
purpose" constitutes punishment).
154. 406 U.S. at 738.
155. 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).
156. Mink, 322 F.3d at 1122; Advocacy Ctr., 731 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
157. Janus & Logan, supra note 142, at 353. It is important to note, however, that incompetent
detainees held for other reasons-such as danger to the community-may not be subject to
durational limits, as there are other reasons for their continued detention. Id. at 355.

2018]

RESTORE, REVERT, REPEAT

343

incompetent detainees.1 5 8 In Youngberg, the Court held that the state
must provide minimally adequate training in order to protect the liberty
interests of civilly committed individuals. 15 9 Like civil commitment, the
purpose of detaining incompetent individuals is, at least in part, to
provide treatment. 160 Incompetent individuals, however, also retain a
liberty interest in freedom from incarceration. Therefore, the state has
an affirmative obligation to not only provide treatment but also to
protect the individual's interest in freedom from incarceration and
ensure he or she maintains competency while detained in jail awaiting
trial. 161
B. The ConstitutionalRight to Adequate Medical Treatment
In addition to the right to be free from punishment before being
found guilty, the Constitution also provides pretrial detainees and
inmates with other basic rights. Most relevant here, jails and prisons
have an obligation to provide medical care for prisoners and inmates
under the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. 16 2 Though pretrial detainees are not covered under- the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause protection against
punishment provides similar rights to pretrial detainees. 163
Accordingly, many courts have found that pretrial detainees maintain
the same right to adequate medical treatment, and thus follow the
standard under the Eighth Amendment to evaluate the detainee's
constitutional claim. 164 Some courts have gone even further, suggesting

158. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (noting that the petitioner may still have a
substantive due process claim because the purpose of the statute permitting commitment is to
incapacitate and treat); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (recognizing the State's
training" to protect the respondent's liberty interest);
duty to provide "minimally adequate ...
Janus & Logan, supra note 142, at 344 (suggesting Youngberg establishes an affirmative duty to
provide treatment).
159. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319.
160. See Seling, 531 U.S. at 265 (explaining that the purpose of civil commitment is
incapacitation and treatment). Additionally, like civil committees, some may be detained due to
judgments that they present a danger to the community.
161. Cf. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 (requiring the state to provide minimally adequate
training to civilly committed individuals); Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing that due process requires facilities to provide individuals with the opportunity to be
cured).
162. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Under either the Eighth Amendment or
the Due Process Clause, the right to medical care is not extensive. For example, prisoners do not
have a choice in the professional who treats them, the treatment location, or the treatment
program model.
163. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); NAT'L COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., supra note 75, at 27.

164. See, e.g., Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996):
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that "the protections provided pretrial detainees by the Fourteenth
Amendment in some instances exceed those provided convicted
prisoners by the Eighth Amendment," because pretrial detainees have
not been convicted and thus cannot be subjected to punishment. 165
Treatment, however, is only mandated for serious medical
needs. 166 And, failure to provide treatment only rises to a constitutional
violation when it constitutes deliberate indifference, as set forth in
Estelle v. Gamble.16 7 As explained by the Supreme Court, deliberate
indifference only constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain," which can occur when prison staff-either medical staff or
guards-disregard medical needs or intentionally interfere with
prescribed treatment. 168 Though negligence or an "inadvertent failure
to provide adequate medical care" does not constitute deliberate
indifference, a consistent pattern of negligence may rise to a
constitutional violation. 169 Under this test, the defendant bears the
burden of proving both that he or she had a serious medical need and
that there was deliberate indifference on behalf of prison officials in
regards to this medical need. 170 A medical need is serious if it has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that
a layperson could recognize the need for medical attention. 171

[W]hile the Supreme Court has not precisely limned the duties of a custodial official
under the Due Process Clause to provide needed medical treatment to a pretrial
detainee, it is plain that an unconvicted detainee's rights are at least as great as those
of a convicted prisoner. Thus, the official custodian .. . may be found liable for violating
the detainee's due process rights if the official denied treatment needed to remedy a
serious medical condition and did so because of his deliberate indifference to that need.
(citations omitted);
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (3d Cir. 1976) ("It would be
anomalous to afford a pretrial detainee less constitutional protection than one who has been
convicted."); see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) ("[T]he due
process rights of a [pretrial detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.").
165. Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002).
166. NATL COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., supranote 75, at 25;

see also McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013) (identifying a serious medical need as
a requirement for a constitutional violation).
167. 429 U.S. at 104-05.
168. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
169. Id. at 105; Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[W]hile a single instance of
medical care denied or delayed, viewed in isolation, may appear to be the product of mere
negligence, repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison
authorities. . .. ").
170. E.g., McGee, 721 F.3d at 480; Brown v. Strain, 663 F.3d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 2011); Inmates
of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979).
171. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Defendants may choose to challenge either the way in which treatment
was provided or the lack of treatment altogether. 172
Though the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended this
mandate to the provision of mental health care, "every court which has
spoken to the issue has equated the two." 1 7 3 Therefore, a judge must
determine whether "inmates with serious mental or emotional illnesses
or disturbances are provided reasonable access to medical personnel
qualified to diagnose and treat such illnesses or disturbances." 1 7 4
Successfully challenging a facility's mental health treatment,
however, may be especially difficult, as disagreements over the proper
treatment or allegations of mere negligence do not constitute deliberate
indifference.1 7 5 For example, in Bellotto v. County of Orange, the Second
Circuit rejected a detainee's claim that inadequate monitoring by
health staff-which led to missed medication dosages and resulted in
hallucinations, an anxiety attack, and a suicide threat-constituted
deliberate indifference. 1 76 Rather, the court found that the plaintiff was
alert and frequently received attention from the mental health medical
staff, including medication adjustment and group therapy. 177 Moreover,
the court emphasized that he did not suffer pain or physical harm as a
result of these alleged deficiencies, suggesting that the inadequate
treatment must make an appreciable difference in the inmate's mental
health status.17 8
Despite the difficulties plaintiffs face in bringing an Eighth
Amendment challenge, courts have outlined several ways in which an
inmate can prove deliberate indifference. For instance, correctional
facilities cannot "prevent an inmate from receiving recommended
treatment for serious medical needs or deny access to a physician
capable of evaluating the need for such treatment."1 7 9

172. See NAT'L COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., supra note 75, at

may apply to how treatment was provided or to a failure to
35 ("[Djeliberate indifference ...
provide treatment when it was mandated.").
173. Id. at 29; see, e.g., Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e now hold
that the requirements for mental health care are the same as those for physical health care
needs."); Pierce, 612 F.2d at 763 (reasoning that psychiatric care for pretrial detainees should be
held to the same standards as the provision of medical treatment for physical illnesses); Bowring
v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding "no underlying distinction between the right to
medical care for physical ills and its psychological or psychiatric counterpart").
174. Pierce, 612 F.2d at 763.
175. See, e.g., Bellotto v. Cty. of Orange, 248 F. App'x 232, 237-38 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a
due process challenge to the adequacy of medical treatment).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 237.
178. Id.
179. Pierce, 612 F.2d at 762.
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Alternatively, "[s]ystemic deficiencies in staffing which
effectively deny inmates access to qualified medical personnel for
diagnosis and treatment of serious health problems" may constitute
deliberate indifference. 18 0 For example, in Inmates of Allegheny County
Jail v. Pierce, the district court held that the jail's treatment amounted
to deliberate indifference of the inmates' serious mental health needs. 181
In particular, the court found that the medical staffing levels were
inadequate: the jail did not employ a psychiatric social worker or a
psychiatrist, but instead had only one part-time physician who spent
three hours a day at the jail seeing both medical and psychiatric
patients. 1 8 2 As a result of these deficiencies, the medical staff
insufficiently monitored inmates' medication, despite it being
prescribed by either the jail doctor or outside providers. 183 Though the
court recognized the limitations of jails as care providers, it noted that
jails must at least be organized and sufficiently staffed to address
emergencies, make referrals, and provide adequate care to inmates.184
Finally, intentionally interfering with prescribed medications
may constitute deliberate indifference.1 8 5 In Purkey v. Green, the Tenth
Circuit found that the prison doctor's discontinuance of a medication
prescribed by another physician-the denial of which caused the inmate
to suffer persistent pain-was sufficient to state a cause of action for
deliberate indifference at an early stage of litigation. 186
The care, or lack thereof, provided at many correctional facilities
likely involves more isolated incidents of negligence, and thus would
not rise to a system-wide level of deliberate indifference. Nevertheless,
jails in which pretrial detainees regularly decompensate may be found
deliberately indifferent. The Wisconsin jail that refused to provide
psychotropic medications to all inmates clearly goes beyond mere
negligence.1 8 7 Similarly, a court could find that jails that knowingly
180. Id.; see also Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding that systematic
deficiencies in staffing required court intervention); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 281
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (finding the prison violated the Constitution because it was "grossly
understaffed," resulting in the poor administration of medical treatment and the intentional denial
of medicine), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974). If the systemic deficiencies in staffing are severe
enough, a court may find that the exercise of informed judgment may be precluded. Pierce, 612
F.2d at 763.
181. 487 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
182. Id. at 642.
183. Id. ("Nurses disburse medications to those inmates who show up at the
office. . . . Naturally, many inmates do not appear routinely for medication.").
184. Id. at 643.
185. Purkey v. Green, 28 F. App'x 736, 743 (10th Cir. 2001).
186. Id.
187. See Desmond & Lenz, supra note 100, at 526 (describing the jail's health care provider's
policy of denying psychotropic drugs to inmates).
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place incompetent detainees in isolation, providing little to no mental
health treatment,1 8 are intentionally interfering with prescribed
treatment and thus are deliberately indifferent. 189
Moreover, the lack of adequate medical staff trained in mental
health may constitute a violation of a detainee's due process rights if it
results in the inadequate provision of treatment. For example, as
discussed above, some Louisiana jails only staff one part-time
psychiatrist and a psychiatry resident, similar to the staffing structure
in Pierce.190 Given the rise in mental health problems in prisons and
jails, an improperly trained staff may be insufficient to meet the jail's
obligation to its inmates. 19 1 Indeed, in many of the cases, experts
concluded that pretrial detainees found incompetent were consistently
not getting the care they needed. 192 As in Pierce, then, insufficient
staffing that causes the inadequate provision of mental health
treatment may rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 19 3
For incompetent individuals, the right to adequate medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause provides less protection than
the right to be free from punishment. While the Jackson line of cases
suggests that jails have an affirmative obligation to provide restorative
treatment, the right to adequate medical treatment only requires jails
to provide treatment sufficient to treat and manage the individual's
underlying mental illness. Nevertheless, this protection creates an
important constitutional obligation to continue an individual's
treatment-at a minimum providing prescribed psychotropic
medications-helping to ensure he or she remains competent.

188. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing the American Bar Association's
recommendation to keep inmates with serious mental illnesses out of isolated units).
189. See Purkey, 28 F. App'x at 743 (finding the jail was deliberately indifferent when it
intentionally interfered with prescribed treatment); see also Langley v. Coughlin, 715 F. Supp.
522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("[C]ourts have repeatedly noted that while one isolated failure to treat,
without more, is ordinarily not actionable, it may in fact rise to the level of a constitutional
violation if the surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of deliberateness, rather than
inadvertence, in the failure to render meaningful treatment."), appeal dismissed, 888 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1989).
190. Advocacy Ctr. for the Elderly & Disabled v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 731 F. Supp. 2d
603, 613 (E.D. La. 2010) (noting that a prison with more than one thousand inmates had one parttime psychiatrist and one resident on medical staff).
191. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (discussing rates of mental illness in the
prison population).
192. E.g., Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934, 940 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (citing expert
testimony that lack of treatment may have worsened incompetent detainee's mental illness).
193. Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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IV. RESTORING INCOMPETENT DETAINEES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: A
MULTI-PRONGED APPROACH TO ENSURE ADEQUATE MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT

In addition to the due process concerns, the cost of the
decompensation cycle and the systemic inefficiencies it creates further
highlight the need to end this cycle. Depending on the severity of the
mental illness and the inadequacy of the jail's mental health treatment,
a pretrial detainee's trial may be delayed for years in order to finally
restore the defendant's competency in time for trial. The cost of
competency treatment ranges from $400 to over $800 per day. 194 Based
on the average time of ninety days to restore competency, one course of
treatment costs approximately $30,000 to $100,000 per defendant.195
If pretrial detainees decompensate several times, the cost of
competency treatment alone can easily reach several hundred thousand
dollars. Indeed, as discussed above, one detainee in Florida waited in
confinement for seventeen years before he was eventually convicted and
after he cost the state $1.3 million. 196 Given the increase in the number
of incompetent defendants, the overall annual cost to states for
treatment is significant and continuing to grow. California now spends
$170 million per year for competency treatment. 197 And in Florida, the
state spends one-fifth of its budget on mental health and competency
treatment programs. 1 9 8
Furthermore, every time a pretrial detainee may be
incompetent, the issue of his competency must be raised during pretrial
proceedings, resulting in a competency evaluation and sometimes a

194. See Terry, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 937 (finding that competency treatment in Arkansas costs
four hundred dollars per day); Kapoor, supra note 48, at 311 (finding competency treatment costs
in Texas, Wisconsin, and Connecticut to be $401 per day, $667 to $833 per day, and $834 per day,
respectively).
195. See Kapoor, supra note 48, at 311 (finding Texas spent $401 per day for competency
treatment, averaging $35,659 per defendant). Additionally, a Florida newspaper compared the
costs of mental health treatment at the state facility and jail, finding that it cost $110,000 a year
to treat someone at the state mental health facility, compared to $17,338 to "house an inmate in a
Florida prison." Krueger, supra note 72.
196. Braga et al., supra note 19.
197. Mac Taylor, An Alternative Approach: Treating the Incompetent to Stand Trial, CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFF. 3, 8 (2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/hlthlistlincompetent-standtrial-010312.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DXU-QLHP].
198. Braga et al., supra note 19. Pretrial detainees in this decompensation cycle also cost more
simply because they are in jail for longer. On top of the regular costs of detaining individuals in
jail, numerous studies have found that the cost to house a mentally ill inmate is significantly
higher due to their substantial needs and higher rates of misconduct. See, e.g., HEALTH MGMT.
AssocS., IMPACT OF PROPOSED BUDGET CUTS TO COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 3,

9-10 (2011) (finding that the cost of housing a mentally ill inmate is three times the cost of housing
other inmates).
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hearing involving both parties, the judge, and experts. 199 This consumes
limited court resources, including both time and money. Over time,
delays in trial may make it more difficult for the prosecutor to convict
the accused due to changes in the prosecution staff, the unavailability
of witnesses, and stale evidence. 200 And yet despite the potential to save
scarce resources, correctional facilities that allow detainees to
decompensate currently face no negative consequences. Therefore,
these institutions are not incentivized to change their behavior to
improve mental health treatment.
In this day and age, when psychiatric treatments can effectively
reduce symptoms, failure to adequately care for inmates with mental
illnesses and maintain their competency is inexcusable. 20 1 More
importantly, given the due process protections owed to incompetent
pretrial detainees, jails simply cannot continue providing inadequate
treatment or standing by as detainees decompensate. As such, this Part
proposes a multi-pronged approach, relying on both the courts and new
technology, to protect the constitutional rights of incompetent pretrial
detainees and prevent decompensation.
A. A FamiliarApproach: Relying on Courts to Enforce Prescribed
Treatment
More state funding on mental health-including prevention, jail
and prison treatment, and competency restoration programs-could
solve many of the issues facing incompetent detainees in the criminal
justice system today. Unfortunately, given the current political
reticence regarding state spending, particularly for issues like mental
health and suspected criminals, this is unlikely to happen in the near
future.
Some states and courts have tried unsuccessfully to address the
decompensation cycle. For example, the state of Florida "work[ed] out a
deal" to allow Bobby Lane McGee to stay at the state mental hospital
until his court date, at which point he was given an injection of
medication that would last for several months, sufficient to complete
his trial. 202 Similarly, commentators have pointed out that "[iun some
cases, the court may order that the person remain at [the state facility]
while awaiting trial, to ensure that he does not again become

199. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
200. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) (explaining that, due to the potential
unavailability of witnesses, delays "may work to the accused's advantage").
201. Stone, supranote 5, at 299-300.
202. Braga et al., supra note 19.
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incompetent due to possible disruptions in treatment." 203 Though
keeping recently restored detainees at the competency treatment
facility satisfies the state's interest in bringing the person to trial on an
individual basis, it does not solve the problem on a large scale. In
practice, this solution is expensive and involves high opportunity costs
to other incompetent detainees who remain in jail awaiting treatment,
potentially causing further delays in treatment.
Instead, in order to protect pretrial detainees' constitutional
rights and comply with the Due Process Clause, judges and courts must
require jails to maintain the treatment recommended by the
competency treatment facility. Jails are not health care providers and
should not be required to provide the exact same standard of care
provided at state mental health facilities. However, the Due Process
Clause requires that correctional facilities provide at least adequate
treatment for serious mental health needs and avoid conditions that
constitute punishment. 204 Accordingly, at a minimum, courts should
require correctional facilities to maintain and monitor the detainee's
medications prescribed at the state mental health facility, ensuring
that the majority of defendants remain competent for trial. This is
consistent with the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards, which recommend that
If a defendant found incompetent to proceed is treated with medication in an inpatient
facility, becomes competent, and returns to jail or to the community to await further legal
proceedings, the court should order as a condition of the defendant's return that the
receiving facility or local treatment facility continue such treatment as the inpatient
20 5
facility may recommend to maintain the defendant's competence.

Medication is the most common and effective form of treatment
provided by state mental health facilities to restore detainees to
competency. 20 6 Numerous studies have discussed the benefits and

203. JUSTICE POLICY INST., WHEN TREATMENT IS PUNISHMENT: THE EFFECTS OF MARYLAND'S
INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES 24 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/

uploads/justicepolicy/documents/when treatment ispunishment-full report.pdf
[https://perma.cclUM3C-7A8Z].
204. See supra Section lI.A; see also Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1258 (N.D. Cal.
1995) ("[S]ome constitutional minima are specific to mental health care. Psychotropic or behavioraltering medication should only be administered with appropriate supervision and periodic
evaluation."), rev'd on other grounds, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1999).
205. AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 30, std. 7-4.11(e). Additionally, after finding that the provision
of medications was such an issue after competency treatment, a Washington State report noted
that "[t]here is support for the limited use of involuntary treatment for defendants who return to
jail after competency restoration treatment in state hospital, in order to ensure the defendant
remains competent for trial." Finkle et al., supra note 31, at 777.
206. See Brief of Am. Psychiatric Ass'n and Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party and Supporting Affirmance at *12, United States v. Loughner,
No. 11-10339, 2011 WL 3672689 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011):
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effectiveness of such medication. 207 These medications often address
symptoms that lead to a diagnosis of incompetency, including
hallucinations, delusions, and psychosis. 208 Moreover, appropriately
dispensing prescribed psychotropic medication is one of the easiest
ways to maintain competency and requires relatively little of jails. Such
an order would not require medical staff with specialized training in
psychiatric care, or ask the jail to provide other treatments, like
therapy, to its detainees.
In some cases, detainees may refuse to take medication, leading
209 In this circumstance, the court's order should
decompensation.
to
require forced medication upon recently restored pretrial detainees.
Though various commentators have argued against involuntary
medication, either due to the potential side effects of psychotropic
medication or in the absence of a judicial hearing, 210 the Supreme Court
has clearly held that "[t]he Due Process Clause permits the State to
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
interest." 211 Subsequently, the Supreme Court permitted involuntary
medication of pretrial detainees, outlining the circumstances in which
incompetent defendants may be forcibly medicated against their will in

Antipsychotic medications are an accepted and often irreplaceable treatment for acute
psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for schizophrenia, because the benefits
of antipsychotic medications, compared to any other available means of treatment,
outweigh their acknowledged side effects. Although psychosocial interventions are
helpful in the long-term management of schizophrenia, they lack proven efficacy for
controlling acute psychotic symptoms.;
Winick, supra note 23, at 22 (explaining that medication is the most effective treatment for
incompetent defendants, but that it requires ongoing use to ensure competency); see also supra
note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that medication is the most common form of
treatment).

207. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 5, at 304-05 (finding that seventy percent of patients with
schizophrenia experience clear improvement from use of antipsychotic drugs, and seventy to eighty
percent of patients with depression or mood disorders improve with use of antidepressant drugs).
208. See id. at 305 (noting that antipsychotic drugs can be used to address symptoms like
psychomotor excitement, hallucinations, delusions, mania, and organic psychosis).
209. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text; see also Robert D. Miller et al., The
Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic PatientPopulation:Six-Month Review, 17
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107, 110-11 (1989) (finding that twenty-nine percent of patients
already taking psychotropic medications and seventy-five percent of newly admitted patients
refused medication after being told of a right to refuse treatment).
210. This is a very controversial topic in the academic literature. However, it is beyond the
scope of this Note to further explore the involuntary medication debate. For an argument that
involuntary medication without a judicial hearing may violate the Due Process Clause, see Patricia
E. Sindel, Fourteenth Amendment: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Masked by Prison
Bars, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 952, 967-79 (1991).
211. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
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Sell v. United States.2 12 Even more importantly, this requirement
ultimately benefits individuals who vacillate between competence and
incompetence, allowing them to avoid the significant pain and suffering
that accompanies the decompensation cycle.
Such an order may also require prisons and jails to spend more
money to hire additional staff to ensure the proper provision of
medications and to fund treatment review committees, which are often
required to forcibly medicate inmates. 2 13 However, reducing the
prevalence of the decompensation cycle will lead to significant cost
savings over time that can be used to support a more robust staff.2 14
And more importantly, given the potential constitutional violations at
stake, a state may not deprive pretrial detainees of their substantive
due process rights due to limited resources. 2 15

B. A Twenty-First Century Approach: Using Telemedicine to Enhance
Mental Health Treatment in CorrectionalFacilities
Though maintaining the treatment prescribed by the state
mental health facility will serve to lessen the chance of decompensation,
some detainees may still begin to decompensate upon their return due
to the conditions of jail. Without specially trained psychiatric staff, the
decompensation may go unnoticed by jail staff. Therefore, to further
reduce the risk of decompensation and to help facilities provide
sufficient care, states should consider using new and emerging
technology to provide "telemedicine" to recently restored pretrial

212. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Specifically, the Supreme Court held:
First, a court must find that importantgovernmental interests are at stake.... Second,
the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those
concomitant state interests . . . [and] that administration of the drugs is substantially
unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability
to assist counsel. . .. Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is
necessary to further those interests.... Fourth ... the court must conclude that the
administration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical
interest in light of his medical condition.
Id. at 180-81. The Sell decision provides a potential exception that may apply to defendants
deemed incompetent to stand trial. See id. at 182-83 (noting that courts applying the Sell test
should determine if the drugs are necessary to a governmental interest, including "whether
medication is permissible to render a defendant competent"). For a discussion about how this
exception may apply to defendants deemed incompetent, see Christopher Slobogin, Sell's
Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, WASH. U.
L. REV. 1523, 1532-35 (2012).
213. Although beyond the scope of this Note, changing the composition and structure of
treatment review committees to be more efficient could also serve to prevent decompensation for
detainees who refuse to take their medication.
214. See supranotes 194-200 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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detainees who have returned to jail. Telemedicine allows medical
personnel to rely on the use of satellite technology, video conferencing,
and data transfer through smartphones and computers to connect
doctors and patients who are located outside of the same setting. 216 In
recent years, telemedicine has emerged as a tool to provide high-quality
psychiatric care. 217 As noted by one article, "[t]elemedicine has the
potential to improve quality of care by allowing clinicians in one 'control
center' to monitor, consult and even care for

. . .

patients in multiple

locations." 218
Telemedicine has emerged as a possible solution to the
underfunding of prison and jail medical facilities and the severe health
needs of many inmates. Recent statistics suggest that at least thirty
states already use telemedicine to address at least one health specialty
in jails or prisons. 219 And in twenty-eight of these states, telemedicine
was most commonly used to provide psychiatric services not available
at the correctional facility. 220 In Texas, for example, the University of
Texas Medical Branch and Texas Tech provide telemedicine and
telepsychiatry to roughly 130,000 inmates each year. 2 2 1
The Bureau of Prisons began testing the use of telemedicine in
its facilities in 1996.222 A study of its implementation found that
telemedicine successfully replaced the use of local consulting
physicians, who would visit the prison on a scheduled basis to provide
treatment. 223 The prisons relying on this technology reported higher
satisfaction with the quality of care provided by the telemedicine
specialists than the consulting psychiatrists who previously provided
care. 224 In two of the four facilities studied, the use of telemedicine
increased the number of psychiatric encounters per month. 225
216. Pauline W. Chen, Are Doctors Ready for Virtual Visits?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/health/07chen.html [https://perma.cc/E644-XMBY].
217. See Kristine Crane, Telepsychiatry: The New Frontierin Mental Health, U.S. NEWS (Jan.
15, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2015/01/
15/telepsychiatry-the-new-frontier-in-mental-health [https://perma.cc/A4GG-UTVY9] (explaining
the use and expansion of telemedicine in providing psychiatric care).
218. Chen, supra note 216.
219. CHARI ET AL., supra note 87, at 8.
220. Id.
221. Stacie Deslich et al., Telepsychiatry in the 21st Century: Transforming Healthcare with
Technology, PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT., Summer 2013, at 1, 8.
222. ABT AssocS. INC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 175040, TELEMEDICINE CAN REDUCE
CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE COSTS: AN EVALUATION OF A PRISON TELEMEDICINE NETWORK 2
(1999).
223. Id. at 15.
224. Id.
225. Id. Similarly, a study of the use of telemedicine for Georgia state prisoners found that
inmates might be more willing to seek psychiatric care through telemedicine because of the lack
of interpersonal intimacy compared to in-person meetings. Deslich et al., supra note 221, at 8.
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Moreover, the prisons reported that the use of telemedicine
psychiatrists was advantageous because they "were available by
telephone as needed to revise medication orders .

.

. [and] had better

medication management skills than did local psychiatrists." 2 2 6 The
prisons using telemedicine also saw a reduction in violent acts, which
many attributed to the improved psychiatric care. 2 2 7 Finally, the use of
telemedicine reduced spending, as it no longer required the transfer of
prisoners to outside medical facilities. 228 A separate study of the use of
telemedicine in ten rural prisons in Arizona found that it saved the
state more than one million dollars due to decreases in transportation
costs, paperwork, and person-hours dealing with grievances. 229
Thus, the use of telemedicine could allow specialized health care
personnel at the state mental health facility to monitor pretrial
detainees who have returned to jail to await trial. As evidenced by the
Bureau of Prisons study, telemedicine can improve the mental health
of inmates at a low cost to the state. 230 Indeed, in one study,
videoconferencing was found to be equally effective in assessing
schizophrenics as in-person interviews by the same staff.2 3 1 Further,
the psychiatrists at the state mental health facility could easily ensure
the detainee is receiving his medications properly and "revise
medication orders" as necessary after speaking with the detainee. 232
Though the use of telemedicine for psychiatry is already
underway, many participating states have reported that their facilities
relied on telemedicine primarily to reduce travel to rural or
geographically remote facilities. 233 Therefore, states would need to
"scale up" this technology in order to meet the needs of detainees at
every correctional facility.
However,
costs associated with
implementing such a system may not be high, as the cost of

226. ABT AssocS. INC., supra note 222, at 29.
227. Id. at 30. In prisons and jails, the use of telemedicine can also reduce the security risks
inherent in transferring prisoners to treatment outside of the facility. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 16-19 (finding that telemedicine saved approximately $27,500 by preventing
transfers to external specialists, and $59,000 in avoiding costly air transfers).
229. Deslich et al., supra note 221, at 8.
230. See ABT ASSOCS. INC., supra note 222, at 22-26 (describing the costs and savings in
implementing telemedicine in correctional facilities).
231. ANNO ET AL., supra note 3, at 175. However, this study noted that the videoconferencing
must be at high bandwidth to be effective, as lower-bandwidth conferencing did not allow providers
to notice nonverbal cues. Id.; see also Deslich et al., supra note 221, at 5 (finding that "[1]atency,
poor image quality, and other possible quality problems experienced over IP networks can hamper
or prevent proper diagnosis").
232. See ABT Assocs. INC., supra note 222, at 29 (describing the ways in which off-site
psychiatrists manage medication).
233. CHARI ET AL., supra note 87, at 6.
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telemedicine technology continues to drop. 2 3 4 Nevertheless, prisons and
jails relying on telemedicine would still need to address questions of
patient safety, security, and confidentiality. 2 3 5
Certainly, an order to maintain treatment recommended by the
state mental health facility, supported by telemedicine, would not
address all the issues facing incompetent pretrial detainees. The
environment of the facility could still prove detrimental to a pretrial
detainee's fragile mental health state. 236 And correctional institutions
should still take steps to train both prison and jail medical staff, as well
as guards, about the signs and symptoms of mental illnesses to allow
for better awareness and treatment within the facility itself. However,
the adequate provision of medication and monitoring by psychiatry staff
from the state competency treatment facility through telemedicine
could go a long way in addressing the faults of our current system that
create a recurring cycle of decompensation.
CONCLUSION
The increase in both mentally ill and incompetent defendants
has stretched the capacity of prisons, jails, and state mental health
facilities to serve these individuals. The prevalence of mentally ill
individuals within the criminal justice system suggests that there is a
substantial need for improved mental health treatment. However, due
to insufficient state funding and inadequate mental health treatment
in jails, many pretrial detainees deemed incompetent cycle through the
treatment system, bouncing between states of competency and
incompetency. Such a decompensation cycle not only wastes scarce
fiscal resources and creates inefficiencies, it also raises significant
substantive due process concerns-affecting an individual's right to
234. See, e.g., ABT ASSOcS. INC., supra note 222, at 4 (noting that even during the short
implementation period when the study was conducted, the cost of telemedicine technology had
continued to decrease significantly). A 2004 report suggested that the cost of implementing
telemedicine in a prison ranged between $50,000 and $75,000. CHAD KINSELLA, COUNCIL OF STATE
Gov'TS, CORRECTIONS HEALTH CARE COSTS 18 (2004). However, a recent article suggests that a
"standard telemedicine unit-including a small audio console, a camera that can zoom in and out,
and a monitor-costs less than $2,000." Michelle Ollove, State Prisons Turn to Telemedicine to
Improve Health and Save Money, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST: STATELINE (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/01/21/state-prisons-turnto-telemedicine-to-improve [https://perma.cc/T&JU-NLCV]. Furthermore, some facilities have
already begun using televisits for nonhealth-related reasons, including family visits. See, e.g., Joe
Mauceri, Televisiting Lets Kids Talk to IncarceratedParents Without Going to Prison, PIX 11 (Aug.
3, 2017, 4:44 PM), http://pixl1.com/2017/08/03/televisiting-lets-kids-talk-to-incarcerated-parentswithout-going-to-prison/ [https://perma.cc/C3SG-795X].
235. Deslich et al., supra note 221, at 6-7 (describing some of the implementation challenges
involving confidentiality, patient security, and safety).
236. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
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adequate medical treatment and liberty interests in freedom from
incarceration and restorative treatment. Furthermore, it causes
individuals to experience significant pain and suffering, even leading to
suicide. To end this cycle, judges must order jails to provide sufficient
mental health treatment to maintain the treatment prescribed by the
state mental health facility. States should also consider other efforts to
support the continued health of these detainees, including the use of
telemedicine, which offers promising outcomes for psychiatric care.
These efforts will help to ensure that individuals who are still presumed
innocent do not suffer at the hands of our criminal justice system.

Margaret Wilkinson Smith*

*
J.D. Candidate, 2018, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A., 2012, Duke University. I
would like to thank Professor Christopher Slobogin for encouraging my interest in mental health
law and serving as a resource along the way; Professor Edward Cheng and Dr. Kimberly Brown
for their thoughtful comments and suggestions; and the editors and staff at the Vanderbilt Law
Review for their diligent, thorough work. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Matt, for his
unwavering love and confidence, as well as my parents and siblings for their constant
encouragement, inspiration, and support.

The Vanderbilt Law Review is published six times a year by the Vanderbilt Law Review,
Vanderbilt University Law School, Nashville, TN 37203-1181. Class "Periodicals" postage is paid at
Nashville, Tennessee, and at an additional mailing office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
Vanderbilt Law Review, Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, Davidson, TN 372031181.
Web Page: http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org
Manuscripts: The Vanderbilt Law Review invites the submission of unsolicited Articles.
Authors may submit manuscripts through Scholastica. Manuscripts cannot be returned. Submit Articles
to:
Senior Articles Editor
Vanderbilt Law Review
Vanderbilt Law School
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181.
En Bane: Vanderbilt Law Review invites all interested readers to submit short pieces for
publication in En Banc, Vanderbilt Law Review's online companion. En Banc offers professors,
practitioners, students, and others an opportunity to respond to articles printed in the Vanderbilt Law
Review. In addition, En Banc also considers comments, essays, and book reviews. For more information,
please see our web page.
Subscriptions: Subscriptions are $50.00 per volume (domestic) and $55.00 per volume
(international). Subscriptions commence with the January issue of each volume. All subscriptions are
continued for each succeeding volume unless subscribers provide timely notice of cancellation. Address
changes must be made at least six weeks before publication date. Subscription claims will be honored
one year from date of issue publication date. However, due to the excess cost of shipping overseas, if a
foreign subscriber's address is correctly entered on our mailing list, we cannot supply another issue for
that subscriber in the event it does not arrive.
Single and Back Issues: For back issues please inquire of: William S. Hein & Co., 1285 Main
St., Buffalo, NY 14209 (1-800-828-7571). The price is $20.00 per issue not including shipping and
handling.
Back issues are also available in PDF format through HeinOnline at
http://www.heinonline.org. Single issues of the current volume are available for $20.00 per issue. Please
contact Faye Johnson at faye.johnson@law.vanderbilt.edu for further information.
Inquiries and Information: Direct all subscription information, requests, and checks to:
Faye Johnson
Program Coordinator
Vanderbilt Law Review
Vanderbilt Law School
131 21st Ave South
Nashville, Tennessee 37203-1181
e-mail: faye.johnson@law.vanderbilt.edu
Copyright: Unless otherwise specified, the Vanderbilt Law Review holds the exclusive
copyright to all articles appearing herein.
Antidiscrimination Policy: The Vanderbilt Law Review abides by the Vanderbilt University
Equal Opportunity Policy, available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/student-handbook/ universitypolicies-and-regulations/#equal-opportunity
The Vanderbilt Law Review supports robust and open academic discussions on all legal topics.
However, the viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent the views of Vanderbilt
Law School or its faculty, students, or staff.
Vanderbilt Law Review
(ISSN 0042-2533)
Q 2017 Vanderbilt Law Review, Vanderbilt Law School

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2017-2018 EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor in Chief
ALEX CARVER

Executive Editor
MARGARET WILKINSON SMITH

Senior Articles Editor
JESSICA L. HAUSHALTER

Articles Editors
CASSANDRA M. BURNS
PAIGE N. COSTAKOS
MONICA E. DION
NICOLE A. DRESSLER
JORDAN B. FIERNANDES
SAMUEL J. JOLLY
VICTORIA L. ROMVARY
BENJAMIN II. STEINER
BRADEN M. STEVENSON

Senior Notes Editor
ZOEM. HEINER

Senior Managing Editor

Senior Er Barc Editor

KOURTNEY J. KINSEL

MIRON KLIMKOWSKI

Notes Development Editor
ALEXANDRA M. ORTIZ

Con ventions Editor
RYAN W. BROWN

Notes Editors

ManagingEditors

JESSICA N. BERKOWITZ

CATIf ERINE C. CIRIELLO
NELL B. HENSON
LOGAN R. HOBSON

JACOB T. CLABO
R. TURNER HENDERSON

SHANNON C. MCDERMOTT

JULIE L. ROONEY

En Banc Editors
MORGAN S. MASON
W. ALLEN PERRY
BLAKE C. WOODWARD

Symposium Editor
JESSICA F. WILSON

DANIELLE J. REID
NICOLE A. WEEKS

PublicationEditor
KAITLYN 0. HAWKINS

Staff
MAURA C. ALLEN
MICHAEL J. BALENT
GABRIELLE L. BLUM
MATTHEW V. BRANDYS
SARAH K. CALVERT

EMILY M. FELVEY
SARAH R. GRIMSDALE
MEREDITH M. HAVEKOST
JAMEs F. HOPPER, JR.
DYLAN M. KEEGAN

NATALIE P. CHRISTMAS
JESSE T. CLAY

STEFFEN C. LAKE
EMILY M. LAMM

GRIFFIN FARiLA

JOSHUA B. LANDIS

JAMES V. LAURIA
DANIEL A. LEVINE
NICHOLAS M. MARQUISS
COLIN J. MARTINDALE
RYAN W. MCKENNEY
BREANNA C. PHILIPS
STEVEN T. POLAND
AUSTIN T. Popp

WILLIAM PUGH
MADISON T. SANTANA
SAMANTHA N. SERGENT
ELIZABETH F. SHORE
J. GRANT SIMS
LAUREN M. STERN
SHANNON N. VREELAND

Alumni Advisory Committee

ADELEM. EL-KiIOURI'13
ASHLEY E. JOHNSON'04

FacultvAdvisor
SEAN 11. SEYMORE

RYANT. HoLT' 10, Chair
J. MARIA GLOVER'07
WILLIAM T. MARKS' 4

ANDREW R. GOULD'10
ROBERTS. REDER'78

ProgramCoordinator
FAYEJOHNSON

VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY

Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professor of Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the
University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellorfor Health Affairs and Dean of the School of
Medicine
Steve Ertel, Vice Chancellorfor Communications
Nathan Green, Interim Vice Chancellorfor Public Affairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellor for Investments and Chief Investment Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellorfor Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellor for Information Technology
Tina L. Smith, Interim Vice Chancellorfor Equity, Diversity and Inclusion
and Chief Diversity Officer
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellorfor Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Chief FinancialOfficer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellorfor University Affairs and Athletics;
Ati letics Director; Professorof Law

LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS

Chris Guthrie, Dean of the Law School; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professorof
Law
Lisa Bressman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; David DanielsAllen
DistinguishedChair in Law; Professorof Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs; Clinical Professor of Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Professorof Law; Associate Dean & Director, Law
Library
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Academ ic Affairs; Professorof Law

FACULTY

&

Brooke Ackerly, Associate Professor of PoliticalScience; Associate Professorof
Philosophy; Associate Professorof Law; Affiliated Faculty, Women's and Gender
Studies; PrincipalInvestigator, Global Feminisms Collaborative
Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, Associate Professorof Jewish Studies and Law;
Associate Professor of Religious Studies; Affiliated Associate Professor of Islamic
Studies and History; Professor of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of French, English and Jewish Studies; Professor of Law
Margaret M. Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise;Professorof Law
Lauren Benton, Dean, Vanderbilt University College of Arts and Science; Nelson 0
Tyron, Jr Chair in History; ProfessorLaw
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James F. Blumstein, University Professor of ConstitutionalLaw and Health Law
Policy: Professorof Management: Owen GraduateSchool of Management;
Director, Vanderbilt Health Policy Center

C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practice of Law
Jon Bruce, Professorof Law Emeritus
Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Professorof Economics; Professor of Law; Professor of
Health Policy; Professor of Leadership, Policy and Organization
Edward K. Cheng, Professor of Law: FedEx Research Professor for 2017-18
William Christie. FrancesHampton Currey Professorof Management in Finance;
Professorof Law
Ellen Wright Clayton, Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics;Professor of Law; Professor
of Health Policy
Mark Cohen, Justin PotterProfessorof American Competitive Enterprise;Professorof
Law; University Fellow, Resources for the Future
Robert Covington, Professor of Law Emeritus
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professorof Economics; Professorof
Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professor in the Humanities; Professorof Law
Paul H. Edelman, Professor of Mathematics; Professor of Law
Joseph Fishman, Assistant Professorof Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus; Professorof History
Emeritus; Lecturer in Law
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey E. George, Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chairin Law & Liberty;
Professor of Political Science; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation & Dispute
Resolution Program;Professor of Law
Daniel J. Gervais, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of French; Director,
Vanderbilt IntellectualProperty ProgramDirector, LL.M. Program;Professorof
Law
Leor Halevi, Associate Professorof History; Associate Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair;Professor of Law and Economics; CoDirector, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alex J. Hurder, Clinical Professor of Law
Sarah Igo, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professorof Law
Owen D. Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professorof Biological
Sciences; Director, MacArthur FoundationResearch Network on Law and
Neuroscience; Professor of Law
Allaire Karzon, Professorof Law Emerita
Nancy J. King, Lee S. and CharlesA. Speir Professorof Law
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professorof Law; Richard G. Maxwell Professorof Law,
UCLA Law School
Craig Lewis, Madison S. Wigginton Professor of Finance;Professorof Law
David Lewis, Chair of the Department of Political Science; William R. Kenan, Jr.
Professor of PoliticalScience; Professorof Law
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professor of Law Emeritus
Terry A. Maroney, Professorof Law; Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society:
ChancellorFaculty Fellow; 2016-17 Andrew W. Mellon FoundationFellowship at
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University;
Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professorof Law Emeritus
Larry May, W. Alton Chairof Philosophy;Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professorof Law
Holly McCammon, Professor of Sociology; Professor of Human and Organization
Development; Professor of Law
Karla McKanders, Clinical Professor of Law
Thomas McCoy, Professor of Law Emeritus

Thomas McGinn, Professor of History; Professorof Law

&

Timothy Meyer. Professorof Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly I. Moran, Professorof Law; Professorof Sociology
Michael A. Newton, Professorof the Practiceof Law; Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice
Program
Robert S. Reder, Professorof the Practice of Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley

McCloy (Retired)

&

Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professorof Economics; Professorof Law
Philip Morgan Ricks, Professor of Law
Amanda M. Rose, Professor of Law
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
James Rossi, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law
and Government
Edward L. Rubin, University Professorof Law and PoliticalScience
John B. Ruhl, David DanielsAllen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law:
Director, Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director,Energy, Environment,
and Land Use Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professorof Law
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Centennial Professorof Law
Sean B. Seymore, Professorof Law; Professor of Chem istry
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Tarkington Chairof Teaching Excellence; Professor of Law;
Professor of History; Chancellor Faculty Fellow Co-Director, George Barrett
Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Education;Assistant Professorof Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Assistant Professorof Law
Ganesh N. Sitaraman, Professorof Law
Paige Marta Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professorof Law; Director,
Criminal Justice Program;Affiliate Professorof Psychiatry
Kevin Stack, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Chairin Law; Professorof Law;
Directorof GraduateStudies, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Carol Swain, Professor of PoliticalScience; Professorof Law
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professorof Law; Director, Legal Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley II Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law
Business Program;Professorof Management, Owen Graduate School of
Management
R. Lawrence Van Horn. Associate Professorof Management (Economics);Associate
Professorof Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael P. Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Director,
Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director, Energy, Environment, and Land
Use Program Professorof Law
W. Kip Viscusi, University DistinguishedProfessorof Law, Economics, and
Management; Co-Director, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alan Wiseman, Professorof PoliticalScience; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in InternationalLaw; Professorof Law;
Director, InternationalLegal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Professorof Law; Enterprise Scholar for 2017-19; Faculty, Co-Director,
LL.M. Program

&

Lawrence Ahern III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir CapitalManagement
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law: Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
& Flon (Retired)
Andrea Alexander, Research Services Librarian;Lecturer in Law
Samar Ali, Adjunct Professorof Law; Attorney, Bass Berry & Sims
Roger Alsup, Instructor in Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructor in Law
Raquel Bellamy, Adjunct Professorof Law; Attorney, Bone McAllister Norton
Gordon Bonnyman, Adjunct Professorof Law; Staff Attorney, Tennessee Justice Center
Kathryn (Kat) Booth, Instructor in Law
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professorof Law: Senior Attorney, Environmental Law
Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law: CoordinatorProgram on Law
Innovation; InauguralExecutive Director, Institute for Conflict Management,
Lipscomb University
Judge Sheila Jones Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate,
Metropolitan Nashville
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christopher Coleman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professorof Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle
District of Tennessee
Hans De Wulf, Visiting Professor of Law; Professor, FinancialLaw Institute,
University of Ghent, Belgium
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professorof Law
Patricia Eastwood, Adjunct Professorof Law; Senior CorporateCounsel, Caterpillar
FinancialServices Corporation
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
William Farmer, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Jones Hawkins & Farmer
Carolyn Floyd, Research Services Librarian;Lecturer in Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professorof Law; District Attorney General, 20th Judicial
District of Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professorof Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware
Court of Chancery
Aubrey (Trey) Harwell, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kirsten Hildebrand, Instructor in Law
Darwin Hindman III, Adjunct Professorof Law; Shareholder, Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme
Court
David L. Hudson, Adjunct Professorof Law
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professorof Law; Co-founder and Managing Director, Elixir
CapitalManagement
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of
Tennessee
Marc Jenkins, Adjunct Professorof Law; Director and CorporateCounsel, Asurion
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20th Judicial District

&

Michele Johnson, Adjunct Professorof Law; Executive Director, Tennessee Justice
Center
Lydia Jones, Adjunct Professor of Law
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professorof Law; Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit
Andrew Kaufman. Adjunct Professorof Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professorof Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professorof Law; Richard C. Maxwell Professorof Law,
UCLA Law School
Kelly Leventis, Instructor in Law
Jerry Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner,Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison
Will Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; General Counsel, FirstBank; Retired Board
Chair, Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation HCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professorof Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office
Robert McNela, Adjunct Professorof Law; Shareholder, Liskow & Lewis
Bryan Metcalf, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sins
Caitlin Moon, Adjunct Professorof Law; Founder and Legal Counsel, Ledger Law; Cofounder and Chief OperatingOfficer, Legal Alignment
Kelly Murray, Instructorin Law
Francisco Mdissnich. Adjunct Professorof Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa Massnich
Aragao Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Tennessee
William Norton III, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professor of Law: Owner, Pickrell Law Group
Michael Polovich, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant Attorney General
Mary Prince, Associate Directorfor Library Services; Lecturer in Law
Rahul Ranadive, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Carlton Fields
Eli Richardson, Adjunct Professorof Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark. Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose. Instructor in Law
John Ryder, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, HarrisShelton Hanover Walsh
Deborah Schander, Associate Directorfor Public Services; Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professorof Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York Capital
Management
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Teresa Sebastian, Adjunct Professor of Law
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professor of Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professorof Law; Assistant FederalPublic Defender,
Middle District of Tennessee
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
Joseph Slights, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of
Chancery
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Judge Amul Thapar, Adjunct Professorof Law; Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger;
Member, Tennessee Board of Education

F. Mitchell Walker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner,Bass Berry & Sims
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professorof Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer,
MetropolitanNashville Airport Authority
Margaret Williams, Adjunct Professorof Law; Senior Research Associate, Federal
Judicial Center
Thomas Wiseman III, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law
Group
Tyler Yarbro, Adjunct Professorof Law; Partner,Dodson ParkerBehm & Capparella

